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We analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in 
terms of the energy efficiency of products. Considering energy taxes, subsidies to firms for 
investment in more eco-friendly products, and product standards, we are particularly 
interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental goals shape the choice of 
policy instruments. Surprisingly, we find that an industry-friendly government levies an 
energy tax to supplement a lax product standard, but shies away from subsidies to firms. By 
contrast, a consumer-friendly government relies heavily on a strict product standard and in 
addition implements a moderate subsidy to firms, but avoids energy taxes. 
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scholarship. 1 Motivation
The continuing deterioration of the environment is one of the major political chal-
lenges. Broadly speaking, we can lower our negative impact on the environment
by reducing overall consumption or by cutting the environmental damage per con-
sumption unit. Policies that try to curb household consumption, however, will not
always be successful. Many consumption activities, such as using washing machines,
refrigerators, computers, TV sets and vehicles are highly price inelastic. Households
will not easily give up washing their clothes, even when they face higher energy or
water prices. And rising fuel prices may only marginally a⁄ect individual driving
habits. In many areas, a more promising government strategy is to aim at reducing
the environmental damage per consumption unit, for instance, by promoting more
energy and water e¢ cient washing machines.
Energy and water e¢ ciency gains have indeed signi￿cantly contributed to limit-
ing the negative impact of consumption activities on the environment. In the EU,
the average energy consumption of washing machines per kg of capacity decreased
by 37% between 1992 and 2005, and average water consumption went down by 31%
between 1997 and 2005 (Faberi et al., 2007). In the US, refrigerators consumed, on
average, in 2001 only 25% of the energy used in 1972. Compared to the hypothetical
energy consumption at the old level of e¢ ciency, this improvement saves the US 200
billion kWh, which is about the annual energy consumption of California (Rosenfeld
et al., 2004).1
Thus, in this paper, we focus on environmental policy as a means to improving
energy e¢ ciency (or likewise water e¢ ciency). Considering energy taxes, subsidies
for investments in more eco-friendly products, and energy e¢ ciency standards, we
are particularly interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental
goals shape the choice of policy instruments. Surprisingly, we ￿nd that an industry-
friendly government levies an energy tax to supplement a lax e¢ ciency standard,
but shies away from subsidies to ￿rms. By contrast, a consumer-friendly government
heavily relies on a strict e¢ ciency standard and additionally implements a subsidy
to ￿rms, but avoids energy taxes.
We derive these results in a model with vertical product di⁄erentiation. Two
￿rms ￿rst invest in the energy e¢ ciency of their products and then are engaged in
price competition. Households buy one of the products and complementary energy.
They di⁄er in the intensity with which they use these goods, and thus in their need
for energy, which is produced in a separate sector. The government can implement
1Further improvements are possible even with today￿ s technologies. For instance, Fraunhofer
IZM (2007) estimates that the average on-mode energy consumption of a 32" LCD TV set can be
reduced by 15% to 30%, simply by applying available technologies.
1an energy tax, a subsidy or a standard, and might be biased towards industry or
consumers. It balances its budget by taxes on or transfers to households.
As is well known, each ￿rm invests in a product with a distinct level of quality,
here in terms of energy e¢ ciency, to di⁄erentiate itself from its competitor and
thus weaken price competition.2 As a consequence of imperfect competition, the
government must employ two instruments to achieve optimal energy e¢ ciency levels
of both high quality and low quality products. First, it needs a subsidy to ￿rms
or an energy tax to induce the high quality ￿rm to improve its product￿ s energy
e¢ ciency. Second, the government has to additionally implement a minimum energy
e¢ ciency standard for energy using products, since the low quality ￿rm is insensitive
to pecuniary incentives.
Distributional preferences matter when it comes to the extent to which di⁄erent
instruments are used. An industry-friendly government relies heavily on an energy
tax, as such a tax increases the energy cost di⁄erential between the products of
the two ￿rms. An energy tax thus accentuates the quality di⁄erential between
the products, thereby weakening price competition and ultimately increasing the
pro￿ts of the two ￿rms. Also, an industry-friendly government introduces only a lax
minimum energy e¢ ciency standard. The reason is that such a standard narrows
the quality gap between the products, thereby reinforcing price competition and
thus reducing pro￿ts.
In contrast, a consumer-friendly government imposes a strict standard and grants
a subsidy that covers a share of each ￿rm￿ s investment in a more energy e¢ cient
product. From the perspective of households, such a subsidy increases energy e¢ -
ciency at lower cost to consumers than an energy tax, even though the subsidy will
be ￿nanced by households and the tax revenues will be given back to households.
In contrast to an energy tax, however, a subsidy does not directly weaken price
competition between ￿rms and thus keeps product prices down.
Our paper shows that the distributional consequences of environmental policy
can be counter-intuitive. At ￿rst glance, it is surprising that the industry gains more
from an energy tax than from a direct subsidy. Likewise, it is far from obvious that
households bene￿t more from paying for subsidies to ￿rms than from implementing
an energy tax, given that tax revenues are handed back to households. Moreover, our
paper provides a justi￿cation for a sensible use of command-and-control instruments
as a supplement to market-based instruments. Independent of the government￿ s
distributional preferences, product standards are somewhat necessary in addition to
2Seminal papers on vertically di⁄erentiated markets include, for example, Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Cremer and Thisse (1994), and Crampes and Hollander
(1995). These contributions, however, do not consider environmental issues.
2taxes or subsidies.
Several previous papers have applied models with vertically di⁄erentiated mar-
kets to environmental problems. Our paper has three key features that set it apart
from these contributions. First, we analyse the optimal choice of environmental
policy instruments. In particular, we show how the distributional preferences of the
government determine which instruments are chosen and to what extent the chosen
instruments are applied. Our analysis is important because most policy decisions
are indeed at least partly driven by concerns about distribution, and not merely
by e¢ ciency considerations. For a variety of reasons, governments carry out redis-
tributive measures not only directly but also indirectly, and in basically all policy
areas, including environmental policy. In contrast to our contribution, many pre-
vious papers explore the impact of exogenous policy changes without considering
the optimal policy and choice of instruments (e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995;
Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003; Moraga-GonzÆlez and Padr￿n-Fumero, 2002; Ron-
nen, 1991) or ignore distributional preferences of the government (e.g. Bansal, 2008;
Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005).
Second, we focus on the joint consumption of vertically di⁄erentiated goods
and energy. Our approach enables us to analyse the impacts of an energy tax in
addition to those of an energy e¢ ciency standard and a direct subsidy to ￿rms. A
major characteristic of an energy tax is that it a⁄ects the ￿ consumption costs￿of
di⁄erent households consuming the very same product very di⁄erently, depending
on the intensity with which households use the speci￿c product. And indeed, this
￿ di⁄erentiated￿impact of an energy tax on ￿ consumption costs￿is exactly the reason
why this instrument so e⁄ectively curbs price competition and turns out to be so
attractive to an industry-friendly government. In contrast, previously analysed taxes
in models with di⁄erentiated products, such as ad valorem taxes on goods and taxes
on emissions generated in the production process (e.g. Bansal, 2008; Cremer and
Thisse, 1999; Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005), lack this particular feature.
Third, households buy eco-friendly goods in our framework because it pays for
them in terms of lower energy costs. Our results do not rely on altruistic or ￿ green￿
sentiments. By contrast, previous contributions refer to ￿ green￿preferences of con-
sumers (e.g. Eriksson, 2004; Rodriguez-Ibeas, 2007; and papers referred to above)
and ignore the role of energy taxes, and likewise water charges.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model. Section 3
explores the quality and price competition between the ￿rms. We then analyse the
optimal environmental policy in section 4. In particular, we show how the choice of
instruments and the extent to which these instruments are applied depend on the
government￿ s distributional preferences. Section 5 discusses two alternative policy
3instruments and sketches two extensions of the model. Finally, section 6 contains
some concluding remarks.
2 Firms, Households, and the Government
Two ￿rms compete in a vertically di⁄erentiated market, with products distinguished
by their energy e¢ ciency. Households di⁄er in the intensity with which they use
these products, and thus in the need for complementary energy consumption. Fi-
nally, the government can implement an energy tax, a subsidy and a minimum
energy e¢ ciency standard to combat a negative environmental externality.
Firms and Technology There are two ￿rms, H and L, located in one country.
They produce output yi, i = H;L. For simplicity, there are no production costs.3
The goods can be used with di⁄erent intensities z, and their consumption requires
a complementary energy consumption (e ￿ ei) per intensity unit. For example, each
washing machine can be used once or ten times a week, and each washing cycle
needs a machine-speci￿c amount of energy.
While the intensity z depends on household type, the energy consumption (e ￿ ei)
per intensity unit is determined by the ￿rms. To reduce energy consumption be-
low the exogenously given basic level e, ￿rms have to redesign their old products
and invent new products with an improved energy e¢ ciency ei.4 These inventive
activities increase ￿xed costs ai. A threefold continuously di⁄erentiable function
ai(ei) captures this notion. It is assumed to ful￿l the properties (i) ai(0) = 0, (ii)
@ai(0)=@ei = 0 and @ai(e)=@ei = 1, and (iii) @2ai=@e2
i > 0. These properties
guarantee ￿ well-behaved￿￿xed costs. In particular, they imply that the higher the
energy-e¢ ciency ei already is, the more expensive a further increase in ei. The
resulting ￿xed costs, however, might be subsidised by the government with rate s,
yielding private ￿xed costs (1 ￿ s)ai.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ￿rm H (L) produces a more (less)
energy e¢ cient good, i.e. eH > eL. Each ￿rm chooses energy e¢ ciency ei and price
3We ￿nd this assumption in many papers. See, for instance, Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995);
Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003); and Moraga-GonzÆlez and Padr￿n-Fumero (2002). Energy
e¢ ciency can indeed be frequently enhanced without a⁄ecting production costs. Fraunhofer IZM
(2007), for instance, analyses several available technologies that reduce energy consumption of TV
sets cost-neutrally.
4Typically, energy e¢ ciency is de￿ned as energy services generated per unit of energy input
(Gillingham et al., 2009). In the current framework with constant energy input per service unit
of z, this would mean that energy e¢ ciency is simply 1=(e ￿ ei). For notational convenience,
however, energy e¢ ciency refers to ei in our paper.
4pi for its product such that its pro￿t ￿i = piyi ￿ (1 ￿ s)ai is maximised. It thereby
takes the decisions of its rival as given.
Households Each household purchases exactly one good, either from ￿rm H
or L. Households di⁄er in their exogenous consumption intensities z. For in-
stance, all households buy a washing machine, but while families use their ma-
chines very frequently, singles use theirs far less often. The distribution of the
household characteristic z over the interval [z;z], z > z > 0, is captured by a
twice-continuously di⁄erentiable distribution function F(z) with the properties: (i)
F(z) = 0 and F(z) = 1, (ii) F 0(z) > 0, (iii) zF 0(z) < 1, and (iv) F 00(z) 2
￿
￿2(F 0(z))
2 =(1 ￿ F(z));2(F 0(z))
2 =F(z)
￿
. The ￿rst two properties are obvious.
The last two properties guarantee well-behaved pro￿t functions.
Denoting by t the gross price of energy (including energy tax), household h￿ s
total costs of consuming good yi with intensity zh amount to pi +t(e ￿ ei)zh. Each
household then chooses the good - either H or L - that minimises its total consump-
tion costs. Equivalently, we can say that each household maximises its ￿ residual￿
income mh = x ￿ pi ￿ t(e ￿ ei)zh + b, given that it consumes one unit of good yi
with intensity zh. Here, the variable x stands for a household￿ s gross income and the
variable b for the lump-sum transfer from, or tax to, the government. We assume
that income x is su¢ ciently high to pay a possible tax and for one of the products
and a household￿ s need for energy. Finally, we normalise the number of households
to one.
Energy and the Environment Pro￿t-maximising ￿rms in a competitive sector
generate energy at constant marginal costs c. Perfect competition implies that the
net energy price households have to pay (i.e. excluding energy tax) equals marginal
costs c. Adding up individual energy consumption (e ￿ ei)zh yields aggregate energy
consumption E, which in turn causes environmental damage D(E). This threefold
continuously di⁄erentiable function expresses damage in pecuniary terms. It is, as
usual, assumed to be convex, i.e. @D=@E > 0 and @2D=@E2 ￿ 0 hold.
Government The government has three policy instruments at its disposal, an
energy tax rate ￿ ￿ 0, a subsidy rate s 2 [0;1) and a minimum energy e¢ ciency
standard emin. This standard emin de￿nes the minimum energy e¢ ciency ei that
products have to achieve. It is limited to elim, i.e. emin ￿ elim. The limit elim is
su¢ ciently low so that both ￿rms ultimately stay in business; that is, each of them
makes a non-negative pro￿t.5 In this sense, we only allow non-drastic standards.
5Similarly, Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), Moraga-GonzÆlez and Padr￿n-Fumero (2002) and
Ronnen (1991), among others, focus on minimum standards that allow two ￿rms to stay in the
5This constraint re￿ ects the fact that ￿ historical￿production rights and legal ￿delity -
apart from political-economic reasons - prevent the government from implementing
drastic regulations that would drive ￿rms out of the market. Finally, the government
uses the tax revenues for lump-sum transfers to households, or levies a lump-sum
tax on households to ￿nance the subsidy to the ￿rms.
The government aims at maximising the weighted aggregate welfare
W = ￿ (￿H + ￿L)
| {z }
Industry welfare
+ [M ￿ D(E)]
| {z }
Consumer welfare
s.t. ￿cE = b + s(aH + aL). (1)
The government￿ s objective (1) can be decomposed into consumer welfare, which
consists of aggregate ￿ residual￿income M net of environmental damage D(E), and
industry welfare, which is equal to aggregate pro￿ts ￿H+￿L. The parameter ￿, which
assigns a weight to industry pro￿ts, is given exogenously. We refer to a government
with ￿ > 1 (￿ < 1) as industry-friendly (consumer-friendly). The borderline case
￿ = 1 constitutes our benchmark. In this case, we label the government as neutral.
We restrict the possible values of ￿ to the interval [￿;￿], where ￿ < 1 < ￿ and ￿
and ￿ are su¢ ciently close to one to guarantee a well-behaved welfare function. As
usual, tax revenues ￿cE have to balance government spending, consisting of subsidy
payments s(aH + aL) and a lump-sum transfer b to households (which might be
negative, i.e. a lump-sum tax).
Timing Decisions take place in three stages. In the ￿rst stage, the government sets
energy tax rate ￿, subsidy rate s, and energy e¢ ciency standard emin. In the second
stage, the two non-cooperative ￿rms decide simultaneously on the energy e¢ ciency
of their goods, eH and eL. In the third stage, the ￿rms choose again simultaneously
their prices, pH and pL. Households decide which product they purchase, and buy
the corresponding amount of energy.
Remarks Some of our assumptions diverge from those in related models and may
need some additional discussions. Our ￿rst remark concerns the consumption pat-
terns of households. We follow the line of reasoning in several papers on vertically
di⁄erentiated markets in assuming that each household consumes exactly one unit
of one of the two product types.6 In contrast to the literature, however, we addi-
tionally assume that households di⁄er in the intensity with which these goods are
used. As the above example of washing machines particularly illustrates, we focus
market.
6The assumption that the market is fully covered is widespread in the literature. Examples
are Bansal (2008), Crampes and Hollander (1995), Cremer and Thisse (1994, 1999) and Eriksson
(2004).
6on goods that can be found in (almost) every household, but are used with di⁄er-
ent intensities. These goods include - besides washing machines - television sets,
refrigerators, computers, vehicles, and so on.
The demand for these goods, and even the intensity of their use, is rather ￿xed, or
at least highly price-inelastic. Whether households wash their dirty clothes, watch
the news, check their emails, and so on is hardly a⁄ected by energy prices. And
even our driving behaviour is fairly insensitive to fuel prices. Instead, consumption
intensities are determined to a large degree by household characteristics - such as
household size - and price-inelastic consumer habits - such as preferring car to train
journeys. When purchasing a washing machine and the like, however, households
are aware of their intensity of use and the implication for their energy consumption,
and accordingly choose their products.7 They are more inclined to buy an energy
e¢ cient but expensive washing machine, the more often they will use it, and thus
the more energy costs they will save.
Consequently, aiming at more energy e¢ cient products is an important pillar of
environmental policy. This aspect is stressed in our basic framework. We focus on
endogenous household product choices and the impact of environmental policy on
these choices, taking total demand and consumption intensity as given. In section
5, however, we sketch an extension to the model that allows for endogenously de-
termined consumption intensities. There, we argue that our results are robust with
respect to this modi￿cation under reasonable assumptions, and provide empirical
support for our assumptions.
Related to this issue is the next point. Since demand and consumption intensity
are considered to be exogenous, we can omit the associated household utility without
a⁄ecting our results. Instead, individual consumer welfare is simply measured by
residual income mh net of environmental damage.
The government￿ s objective function, which assigns the weight ￿ to industry
pro￿ts, might re￿ ect the politicians ￿ intrinsic￿distributional preferences. Alterna-
tively, it can be interpreted as a political support function. Then, the weight ￿
stands for the industry￿ s political in￿ uence - for instance, for its ability to lobby
e⁄ectively. This kind of political support function can be derived from more sophis-
ticated models of public decision making. For our purpose, however, this reduced
form is su¢ cient, since we are predominantly interested in the implications of ￿ bi-
ased￿government choices for environmental policies, not in its causes.8
7Importantly, consumers can nowadays easily collect and compare information about the prod-
ucts￿energy e¢ ciency. In the EU, for instance, manufacturers of household appliances are required
to provide information about their products￿energy e¢ ciency, and retailers have to clearly label
this information. See Council of the European Communities (1992).
8See Peltzman (1976) for a seminal paper on political support functions and Rauscher (1997),
7Finally, note that we refer to energy e¢ ciency and an energy tax. The same
line of reasoning, however, would of course be valid for water e¢ ciency and a water
charge.
3 Market Equilibrium
As usual, we solve our model by backward induction and look for the subgame-
perfect equilibrium. In this section, the market outcome is analysed for a given
environmental policy.
3.1 Price Competition
In the third stage, each household h decides on whether one unit of either product yH
or product yL is purchased. The corresponding total consumption costs are either
pH + t(e ￿ eH)zh or pL + t(e ￿ eL)zh, where t = (1 + ￿)c. Comparing the two
values reveals that a household prefers good H (L) if and only if its consumption
intensity zh is above (strictly below) the threshold value
e z =
pH ￿ pL
(1 + ￿)c(eH ￿ eL)
. (2)
This threshold level is determined by the ratio of the price di⁄erential pH ￿ pL
to energy cost di⁄erential (1 + ￿)c(eH ￿ eL). Obviously, all households would go
for the more energy e¢ cient product if its price pH were equal or lower than its
rival￿ s price pL. (We exclude the case eH = eL, since this can never be a subgame-
perfect equilibrium, as discussed below.) For pH > pL, only households with a high
consumption intensity zh ￿ e z purchase the more energy e¢ cient good, since their
savings in energy costs more than compensate them for the higher product price.
The other households prefer the less energy e¢ cient good, since the lower product
price more than o⁄sets their higher energy costs.
Consequently, the two demand functions for goods H and L are yH = 1 ￿ F (e z)
and yL = F (e z), respectively. Then the pro￿ts of the two ￿rms are
￿H = pH [1 ￿ F (e z)] ￿ (1 ￿ s)aH and ￿L = pLF (e z) ￿ (1 ￿ s)aL. (3)
At this stage, the energy e¢ ciency levels eH and eL are given, and the corresponding
￿xed costs aH and aL are sunk. Also, the energy tax rate ￿ is already determined,
and the net energy price is equal to c (which follows from constant marginal costs c
of energy generation and perfect competition in the energy sector). Then, each ￿rm
chapter 7, for an application to environmental issues.
8maximises its pro￿t (3) with respect to its price, taking the choice of its competitor
as given. This maximisation implies the usual trade-o⁄. A higher price reduces
demand, but increases the revenues from the remaining customers. Firms balance
these two opposing e⁄ects, and rearranging the ￿rst order conditions for an interior
solution implicitly yields the prices9
pH = (1 + ￿)c(eH ￿ eL)
1 ￿ F (e z)
F 0 (e z)
and pL = (1 + ￿)c(eH ￿ eL)
F (e z)
F 0 (e z)
. (4)
Calculating the price di⁄erential pH ￿pL and inserting the resulting expression into
the threshold condition (2) then leads to the equilibrium threshold level
e z =
1 ￿ 2F (e z)
F 0 (e z)
. (5)
Assuming that eH > eL holds, we can now characterise the price competition
equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Price Competition
(i) A unique price competition equilibrium (pH;pL;e z) exists. Both prices are positive
and given by (4), with pH > pL. Threshold e z lies in the open interval (z;z) and is
given by (5).
(ii) Threshold e z and the resulting positive output levels yH = 1￿F (e z) and yL = F (e z)
are independent of energy tax rate ￿ and energy e¢ ciency levels eH and eL.
(ii) Both prices, pH and pL, increase (decrease) with energy e¢ ciency eH (eL).
That is, @pi=@eH > 0 and @pi=@eL < 0. More importantly, both prices, pH and pL,
increase with energy tax rate ￿. That is, @pi=@￿ > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. A more energy e¢ cient
good H widens the quality gap. Since the products then become more di⁄erentiated,
price competition is weakened, and both ￿rms raise their prices. By contrast, a
higher energy e¢ ciency of good L narrows the quality gap, yielding less di⁄erentiated
products. Consequently, price competition is intensi￿ed, and both ￿rms lower their
prices.10 No matter whether quality eH or eL varies, the price di⁄erential pH ￿
pL increases, or decreases, proportionally to the quality gap eH ￿ eL, leaving the
threshold e z and equilibrium demand for each good unchanged.
More interestingly, a higher tax allows both ￿rms to raise their prices. The reason
is that a higher tax increases the energy cost di⁄erential (1 + ￿)c(eH ￿ eL), thus
9The second order condition for pro￿t maximisation is satis￿ed for both ￿rms under property
(iv) of the distribution function.
10This kind of result is well known from the literature on vertically di⁄erentiated markets. See,
for instance, Ronnen (1991).
9generating more economically di⁄erentiated goods H and L. Since greater economic
di⁄erentiation alleviates price competition, both ￿rms increase their prices. By
contrast, a lower energy tax implies less economically di⁄erentiated goods, leading
to intensi￿ed price competition. Consequently, both ￿rms decrease their product
prices.
3.2 Energy E¢ ciency Competition
In the second stage, the two ￿rms determine their products￿energy e¢ ciency levels
eH and eL. Each ￿rm again takes the decision of its competitor and the implemented
environmental policy as given. Moreover, it anticipates the impact of its choice of
quality on the outcome of the succeeding price competition stage. Taking optimal
prices (4) and lemma 1 (ii) into account, the marginal e⁄ects of the products￿energy
e¢ ciency levels on the ￿rms￿pro￿ts are
@￿H
@eH
= (1 + ￿)c
[1 ￿ F (e z)]
2
F 0 (e z)






= ￿(1 + ￿)c
[F (e z)]
2
F 0 (e z)




for ￿rm H and ￿rm L, respectively. Consider ￿rst the situation of the high quality
￿rm H (see (6)). On the one hand, a greater energy e¢ ciency eH widens the quality
gap between the products and thus softens price competition. Consequently, prices,
revenues and pro￿ts increase, as captured by the ￿rst term on the RHS. On the other
hand, a greater energy e¢ ciency goes along with greater ￿xed costs, as shown by the
second term on the RHS. Since this e⁄ect depresses pro￿ts, ￿rm H has to balance
two opposing e⁄ects. The pro￿t-maximising energy e¢ ciency is thus characterised






c[1 ￿ F (e z)]
2
F 0 (e z)
. (8)
The situation of the low quality ￿rm L is slightly di⁄erent (see (7)). A greater
energy e¢ ciency eL obviously means higher ￿xed costs, as in the case of its com-
petitor. This e⁄ect is again captured by the second term on the RHS. In addition,
a greater energy e¢ ciency closes the quality gap, and thus reinforces price competi-
tion. In response, prices, revenues and pro￿ts decline, as re￿ ected in the ￿rst term
on the RHS. Since both e⁄ects work into the same direction, ￿rm L chooses the
lowest possible energy e¢ ciency level, given the environmental standard emin. That
is,
eL = emin. (9)
11The second order condition @2￿H=@e2
H = ￿(1 ￿ s)@2aH=@e2
H < 0 is ful￿lled.
10For su¢ ciently small emin, both ￿rms can make non-negative pro￿ts, and the
resulting quality competition equilibrium is characterised in
Lemma 2 Energy E¢ ciency Competition
(i) Up to the permutation of the two ￿rms across the two indices, there exists a
unique energy e¢ ciency competition equilibrium (eH;eL), with eH > eL = emin and
energy e¢ ciency eH given by (8).
(ii) Energy e¢ ciency eH strictly increases with energy tax rate ￿ and subsidy rate s
(i.e. deH=d￿ > 0 and deH=ds > 0). It does not respond to changes in standard emin.
(ii) Energy e¢ ciency eL strictly increases with energy e¢ ciency standard emin (more
precisely, deL=demin = 1). It is independent of energy tax ￿ and subsidy s.
Proof. See appendix.
The arguments behind lemma 2 run as follow. Firms use energy e¢ ciency as a
means of vertically di⁄erentiating their goods from those of their rivals. A larger en-
ergy cost di⁄erential (1 + ￿)c(eH ￿ eL) between the products of the two ￿rms weak-
ens price competition and allows both ￿rms to charge higher prices. The marginal
impact of a rise in the physical quality gap eH ￿ eL on the energy cost di⁄erential,
and thus on prices, is the greater, the higher the energy tax ￿. In this sense, the
energy tax reinforces the importance of the physical quality gap. Consequently, a
higher tax increases the incentives to widen the quality gap. The more eco-friendly
￿rm H invests even more in increasing energy e¢ ciency eH while ￿rm L sticks to
the lowest possible level of quality eL.
In contrast to the energy tax, the subsidy provides a direct incentive to invest
more in a product￿ s energy e¢ ciency by lowering a ￿rm￿ s ￿xed costs. This positive
e⁄ect, however, only induces the high quality ￿rm to improve the energy e¢ ciency
of its product. As a subsidy cannot su¢ ciently alter the bene￿ts of vertical product
di⁄erentiation, it cannot a⁄ect ￿rm L￿ s quality decision (as long as the subsidy rate
is below one).
The low quality ￿rm only responds to a more strict e¢ ciency standard emin
and adjusts its product￿ s energy e¢ ciency eL accordingly. This measure, however,
does not a⁄ect the decision of the high quality ￿rm in the second stage. Instead
of changing the quality of its product, ￿rm H cuts its prices in the third stage in
response to a higher energy e¢ ciency of its rival￿ s product.
The choices of ￿rms and households in the second and third stages lead to the
equilibrium energy consumption
E = (e ￿ eL)Z
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114 Environmental Policy
In the ￿rst stage, the government chooses the policy that maximises its objective
function subject to its budget constraint. It anticipates the impact of its decision
on market equilibrium and environmental damage.
4.1 Welfare
Since the government gives tax revenues back to households in a lump-sum fashion,
energy tax payments have no direct impact on aggregate residual income M. The
net tax burden of the households only results from subsidy payments to ￿rms. Thus
aggregate residual income M is equal to x￿pHyH ￿pLyL ￿cE ￿s(aH + aL). Then
reformulating welfare (1) yields
W = (￿ ￿ 1)(￿H + ￿L)
| {z }
Industrial component




where ￿H, ￿L, aH aL, and E are de￿ned by (3), (4), (5), (8), (9), and (10). That is,
welfare can be decomposed into a traditional component and an industrial one. The
traditional component is simply equal to the sum of consumer welfare M￿D(E) and
￿rms￿pro￿ts ￿H+￿L. The industrial component contains the ￿rms￿pro￿ts ￿H+￿L,
revalued by the ￿ net￿weight (￿ ￿ 1). It adds concerns about the distribution of
bene￿ts between ￿rms and consumers to the government￿ s objective function.
For ￿ = 1, the government pays no attention to this issue of distribution and
maximises only the traditional welfare component. This captures the ￿ traditional￿ ,
e¢ ciency-oriented welfare maximising scenario. For ￿ > 1, the government is
industry-friendly and places a positive net weight (￿ ￿ 1) on aggregate pro￿ts, be-
sides taking account of the traditional objective. That is, pro￿ts count more than
consumers￿residual income (cf. (1)). By contrast, for ￿ < 1, the government is
consumer-friendly and assigns a negative net weight (￿ ￿ 1) to pro￿ts. That is,
pro￿ts count less than consumers￿residual income.12
4.2 Choice of Policy Instruments
The distributional preferences of the government are important, as they drive the
choice of policy instruments. In exploring these preferences, we apply
De￿nition 1 Equivalent Tax-Subsidy Bundles
Consider two tax-subsidy bundles (￿1;s1) and (￿2;s2). They are said to be equivalent
12Recall that the government objective (11) can be interpreted as a political support function.
See our remarks at the end of section 2.
12if and only if they induce the same energy e¢ ciency eH in equilibrium; that is, if
and only if eH (￿1;s1) = eH (￿2;s2).
The optimality condition (8) implies that two tax-subsidy bundles (￿1;s1) and







holds. This equivalence condition simply re￿ ects the fact that there is an in￿nite
number of tax-subsidy bundles that provide the same incentives for ￿rm H to in-
vest in energy e¢ ciency. Despite their equivalence, however, the government is not
necessarily indi⁄erent between these tax-subsidy bundles, as summarised in
Proposition 1 Preferences over Policy Instruments
Consider the equivalent tax-subsidy bundles (￿1;s1) and (￿2;s2) with ￿1 6= ￿2 and
s1 6= s2. For a given standard emin, we can state:
(i) A neutral government (￿ = 1) is indi⁄erent between two equivalent tax-subsidy
bundles (￿1;s1) and (￿2;s2). That is, W (￿1;s1;emin) = W (￿2;s2;emin).
(ii) A consumer-friendly government (￿ < 1) prefers tax-subsidy bundle (0;s1) to
every equivalent bundle (￿2;s2). That is, W (0;s1;emin) > W (￿2;s2;emin), including
the special case W (0;s1;emin) > W (￿2;0;emin).
(iii) An industry-friendly government (￿ > 1) prefers tax-subsidy bundle (￿1;0) to
every equivalent bundle (￿2;s2). That is, W (￿1;0;emin) > W (￿2;s2;emin), including
the special case W (￿1;0;emin) > W (0;s2;emin).
Proof. See appendix.
For a given standard emin, two equivalent tax-subsidy bundles (￿1;s1) and (￿2;s2)
yield the same equilibrium allocation (eH;eL;E), and thus the same ￿xed costs aH
and aL and the same environmental damage D(E). Not surprisingly, a neutral gov-
ernment, which cares only about the overall outcome in terms of costs and bene￿ts
of a cleaner environment, is indi⁄erent between equivalent policy bundles, as part
(i) of proposition 1 states.
The intuition for the conclusions in parts (ii) and (iii) of this proposition is less
obvious. Surprisingly, an industry-friendly government prefers an energy tax to an
equivalent subsidy or tax-subsidy mix, although the ￿nancial implications of the two
instruments seem to favour a subsidy from the ￿rms￿perspective. While the subsidy
implies direct payments to the ￿rms, the energy tax entails no immediate bene￿t to
the industrial sector. Just as surprisingly, a consumer-friendly government goes for
a subsidy to the ￿rms rather than for an equivalent energy tax or tax-subsidy mix,
although the ￿nancial implications for households seem to favour the energy tax.
13The subsidy payments have to be fully covered by the households￿tax payments.
In contrast to the subsidy, the emission tax does not cause a net tax burden on
households at the aggregate level, since the revenues are handed back to them.
The key di⁄erence between the energy tax and the subsidy, however, is not
the direct redistribution e⁄ect via the tax-transfer system, but the indirect one via
market mechanisms. An energy tax induces ￿rm H to invest more in its product￿ s
energy e¢ ciency, since the tax reinforces the positive impact of a rise in the physical
quality gap eH ￿eL on product prices, as discussed above. As a consequence of the
tax, the prices of both ￿rms increase directly and indirectly; that is, @pi=@￿ > 0 and
(@pi=@eH)(@eH=@￿) > 0 hold (see lemmas 1 and 2 and equilibrium prices (4)). The
twofold rise in both product prices raises the revenues and pro￿ts of both ￿rms at the
expense of consumers, who end up with a lower residual income at the aggregate
level. The induced redistribution through the product market makes such a tax
attractive for an industry-friendly government and unattractive for a consumer-
friendly government.
A subsidy, in contrast, increases energy e¢ ciency eH because it reduces the
costs of product quality. Since this instrument rewards investment in the energy
e¢ ciency of a product in a more targeted fashion, a subsidy increases prices only
indirectly, but not directly. That is, (@pi=@eH)(@eH=@s) > 0 results, but @pi=@s =
0. Consequently, a subsidy limits redistribution from households to ￿rms more
e⁄ectively than an energy tax. For this reason, a consumer-friendly government
endorses a subsidy and shies away from an emission tax, whereas an industry-friendly
government does exactly the opposite.
4.3 Optimal Emission Taxes, Subsidies, and Standards
So far, we have discussed the preferred policy instruments of di⁄erent government
types. Now, we explore the optimal energy tax, subsidy and standard. To this end,
we derive the marginal impact of changes in the three policy instruments:
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where we made use of the envelope theorem in (13) and (14). The ￿rst line of each
derivative captures the marginal e⁄ect of the policy instrument on aggregate pro￿ts,
the second line on the traditional welfare component. As before, we di⁄erentiate
between a neutral, consumer-friendly and industry-friendly government.
Neutral Government (￿ = 1) We ￿rst consider - as a benchmark - a neutral
government. Its optimal policy mix is characterised in
Proposition 2 Optimal Policy Mix of a Neutral Government (￿ = 1)
Consider a neutral government (￿ = 1). In the subgame-perfect equilibrium, the
optimal policy mix (￿￿;s￿;e￿
min) consists of a tax-subsidy bundle that ful￿ls the con-
dition
￿





[1 ￿ F (e z)]
2 =f (e z)
￿ 1 (16)














For ￿ = 1, the ￿rst lines of the derivatives (13), (14), and (15) vanish, and the
second lines capture the simple trade-o⁄ that a neutral government faces. On the
one hand, more energy-e¢ cient products cut environmental damage and save energy
costs, as re￿ ected by the term [(@D=@E) + c]Z
agg
i . On the other hand, more eco-
friendly products increase ￿xed costs, as captured by the term @ai=@ei. Balancing
these two opposing e⁄ects leads to the optimal tax-subsidy bundles (￿￿;s￿) and
standard e￿
min which induce optimal e¢ ciency levels e￿
H and e￿
L.13
Since the in￿nite number of tax-subsidy bundles (￿￿;s￿) that induce ￿rm H
to choose the optimal energy e¢ ciency eH include (￿￿;0) and (0;s￿), an energy
tax alone, or a subsidy alone, is su¢ cient to implement the optimal solution. In
addition, the energy e¢ ciency standard e￿
min, which forces ￿rm L to raise its product
quality to e￿
min, is necessary because the low quality ￿rm does not respond to the
13We focus on situations in which the optimal standard e￿
min lies in the interval (0;elim ). Thus,
the non-drastic standard restriction emin < elim prevents the government from implementing an
allocation with only one ￿rm in the market, but it does not constrain the second-best solution
described by (17). We assume this kind of interior solution in the following analysis.
15other instruments. This justi￿es to some extent the use of standards, a traditional
command-and-control instrument, in addition to taxes and subsidies, two market-
based instruments.
Consumer-friendly government (￿ < 1) We now turn to the optimal policy
mix of a consumer-friendly government, which is characterised in
Proposition 3 Optimal Policy Mix of a Consumer-Friendly Government (￿ < 1)
(i) Consider a consumer-friendly government (￿ < 1). In the subgame-perfect equi-
librium, the optimal policy mix consists of a subsidy s￿￿ and a minimum energy
e¢ ciency standard e￿￿
min. The optimal subsidy rate s￿￿ increases with the preference
parameter ￿, while the optimal standard e￿￿
min decreases with ￿. That is, ds￿￿=d￿ > 0
and de￿￿
min=d￿ < 0.
(ii) Measured in terms of induced energy e¢ ciency levels eH and eL, the optimal
subsidy s￿￿ is less eco-friendly, and the optimal standard e￿￿
min is more restrictive,
than the corresponding tax-subsidy bundle (￿￿;s￿) and standard e￿
min of a neutral
government. That is,
eH (s








As Proposition 3 shows, consumer friendliness does not only drive the choice of
policy instruments, but also the extent of their use. A consumer-friendly government
implements a subsidy instead of an energy tax, as a subsidy implies less redistri-
bution from households to ￿rms than an energy tax, for reasons already discussed
above. But although a subsidy limits redistribution at the expense of households,
it does not eliminate this kind of redistribution altogether. Consumers still have to
￿nance the subsidy payment and additionally su⁄er from higher product prices in
response to a greater energy e¢ ciency eH.
The implications of a standard are very di⁄erent. A higher standard narrows
the quality gap, and thus the energy cost di⁄erential, between product types. The
high quality and low quality products become more similar, leading to intensi￿ed
price competition. As a consequence, product prices, revenues and pro￿ts of both
￿rms decline to the bene￿t of the consumers whose aggregate residual income rises.
These redistributional implications favour a standard over a subsidy. And the more
consumer-friendly the government is (i.e. the lower ￿), the more attention it pays
to redistributional e⁄ects, leading to a stricter standard and a lower subsidy, as part
(i) of proposition 3 states.
16This focus on a standard, rather than a subsidy, is also re￿ ected in the resulting
allocation. Compared to a neutral government, a consumer-friendly government
enforces a greater energy e¢ ciency of the low quality product, but accepts a lower
energy e¢ ciency of the high quality product, as part (ii) of proposition 3 argues.
Again, this outcome stems from the distributional goal.
Industry-friendly government (￿ > 1) Let us ￿nally consider an industry-
friendly government. Its optimal policy mix is characterised in
Proposition 4 Optimal Policy Mix of an Industry-Friendly Government (￿ > 1)
(i) Consider an industry-friendly government (￿ > 1). Its optimal policy mix con-
sists of an energy tax ￿￿￿￿ and a minimum energy e¢ ciency standard e￿￿￿
min. The
optimal tax rate ￿￿￿￿ increases with the preference parameter ￿, while the optimal
standard e￿￿￿
min decreases with ￿. That is, d￿￿￿￿=d￿ > 0 and de￿￿￿
min=d￿ < 0.
(ii) Measured in terms of induced energy e¢ ciency levels eH and eL, the optimal
tax ￿￿￿￿ is more eco-friendly, and the optimal standard e￿￿￿
min is laxer, than the cor-
responding tax-subsidy bundle (￿￿;s￿) and standard e￿
min of a neutral government.
That is,
eH (￿








By now, the economic intuition for these results is clear. We have already ex-
plored that an industry-friendly government implements an energy tax and shies
away from a subsidy for redistribution reasons. As discussed above, an emission tax
implicitly redistributes from households to ￿rms. A standard, by contrast, enriches
consumers at the expense of ￿rms. Nevertheless, a standard cannot be completely
avoided, but, not surprisingly, an industry-friendly government distorts its policy
towards the energy tax and away from the standard. This distortion is the more
pronounced, the more industry-friendly the government (i.e. the greater the prefer-
ence parameter ￿).
The distorted policy mix is re￿ ected in the resulting allocation. Compared to a
neutral government, an industry-friendly government induces a higher energy e¢ -
ciency of the high quality product, but allows a lower energy e¢ ciency of the low
quality product.
5 Discussion
We have so far analysed three widespread policy instruments. In this section, we
discuss informally two alternative instruments, a discriminatory investment subsidy
17and a rebate for the purchase of an energy e¢ cient product. We argue that exploring
these alternative instruments does not lead to signi￿cant additional insights, thus
justifying our initial selection of instruments. Furthermore, we sketch two possible
extensions of our model, to consider energy costs in production and endogenous con-
sumption intensities. We argue that our results prove to be robust under reasonable
and empirically supported assumptions.
5.1 Alternative Policy Instruments
Let us start by analysing two alternative policy instruments. First, the government
could subsidise only the investment of the ￿rm with the more energy e¢ cient prod-
uct. Such a discriminatory subsidy could replace the non-discriminatory subsidy ap-
plied above. After all, the non-discriminatory investment subsidy does not a⁄ect the
quality decision of the ￿rm whose product just ful￿ls the minimum standard. It just
generates a windfall pro￿t to the low quality ￿rm. Replacing the non-discriminatory
subsidy by a discriminatory one would further limit redistribution in favour of ￿rms,
without a⁄ecting energy e¢ ciency and pollution.
Such a change of policy, however, would only reinforce our key conclusions.
A consumer-friendly government, which already prefers a non-discriminatory sub-
sidy to an energy tax, would endorse even more a discriminatory subsidy. And an
industry-friendly government, which prefers an energy tax to a non-discriminatory
subsidy, would object even more to a discriminatory subsidy.
Second, the government could grant a rebate to consumers who buy the high
quality product. For instance, this rebate could take the form of ￿HpH, ￿H ￿ 0, so
that households would e⁄ectively pay (1 ￿ ￿H)pH for the high quality product while
￿rm H would still receive pH. Interestingly, a consumer-friendly government would
not prefer this instrument to the discriminatory investment subsidy discussed above.
To see this, note that a rebate ￿HpH to consumers would not a⁄ect the ￿rms￿market
shares, which would still be described by equation (5). Like an investment subsidy,
a rebate would provide an incentive for ￿rm H to invest in a more energy e¢ cient
product, which would indirectly raise price pH. But, unlike an investment subsidy,
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As (20) and (4) show, the direct e⁄ect of the rebate ￿H on price pH, i.e. @pH=@￿H,
resembles the direct e⁄ect of the energy tax ￿, i.e. @pH=@￿. And because of this
direct impact on prices, a consumer-friendly government prefers a (discriminatory)
investment subsidy not only to an energy tax but also to a rebate to eco-friendly
18consumers.
Also, an industry-friendly government prefers an energy tax to a consumer re-
bate. The reason is that the above rebate directly raises only the price of the high
quality product.14 In contrast, an energy tax directly increases the prices of both
the high quality and low quality products, as outlined in sections 3 and 4. All in all,
industry-friendly and consumer-friendly governments both regard a consumer rebate
as inferior, either to an energy tax or to a (discriminatory) investment subsidy.
5.2 Extensions of Model
To check the robustness of our results, we ￿nally discuss two extensions of our model.
First, we take into account that energy costs also contribute to production costs.
More precisely, let us assume that both ￿rms need ￿ energy units to produce one
unit of output, where ￿ is given exogenously. (All other assumptions are unaltered.)
Then, marginal production costs are (1 + ￿)c￿, and both equilibrium prices pH and
pL rise by the very same amount (1 + ￿)c￿. That is, these energy production costs
are fully passed on to and born by households. This level e⁄ect on prices does
not change each ￿rm￿ s market share nor does it a⁄ect the incentives to invest in
more energy e¢ cient products. The optimal instrument choices and the optimal
environmental policies remain the same, too - given that all energy tax revenues are
handed back to households, as assumed before.
The second extension that we sketch is less straightforward. We continue to
assume that the market is fully covered. But we now determine the consumption
intensity endogenously. For instance, each household still purchases one car, but the
number of miles driven in the car depends on fuel prices. To see whether our model
is robust with respect to this extension, we brie￿ y discuss whether an endogenous
consumption intensity alters the characteristics of the market equilibrium.
Recall that the market equilibrium exhibits two decisive features: First, both
prices pH and pL increase with energy tax ￿. And second, the energy e¢ ciency of
the high quality product eH also increases with tax ￿. These characteristics might
not hold if the consumption intensity is endogenous. The reason is that a higher
energy price depresses the households￿consumption intensities. If this e⁄ect is strong
enough and consumption intensities drop su¢ ciently, then more households start to
prefer the low quality product, and price competition is reinforced. Since demand
for the more eco-friendly good falls, the incentive to invest in its energy e¢ ciency
declines, too. Hence, an energy tax can lead to lower prices pH and pL and to a
lower energy e¢ ciency eH. Such a perverse market outcome would undermine our
14The price pL of the low quality product is still given by the corresponding expression in (4).
19key conclusions.
We argue, however, that such an outcome does not occur under reasonable as-
sumptions. To make our point as simple as possible, let us assume that house-
hold h￿ s utility is given by Vh = ￿hU(zh) ￿ mh, where residual income mh =
x ￿ pi ￿ t(e ￿ ei)zh + b is de￿ned as above and U0(z) > 0 and U00(z) < 0 hold.
The new preference parameter ￿h is distributed according to a distribution function
F(￿) which has the same properties as F(z) above. Intensity zh is now deter-
mined endogenously. For convenience, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
￿ = ￿U0(z)=[U00(z)z] is assumed to be constant. Then, the prices pH and pL and
the energy e¢ ciency eH increase with energy tax ￿ if and only if the elasticity ￿
is smaller than one, i.e. @pi=@￿ > 0 and @eH=@￿ > 0 , ￿ < 1. Translated into
demand elasticities, this means that the key features of the market equilibrium re-
main valid if - for a given product choice and energy e¢ ciency - the energy price
elasticity of the consumption intensity, and thus of energy demand, ranges between
0 and ￿1.15 As this elasticity condition indicates, a fully inelastic demand in terms
of consumption intensity is not necessary for our results to hold, demand only has
to be su¢ ciently inelastic.
To see whether this condition is ful￿lled in reality, note that our elasticity con-
dition refers to the change in consumption intensity for given product choice and
quality. That is, it refers to the short-term demand elasticity of consumption inten-
sity, and thus of energy demand (cf. Reiss and White, 2005). And there is indeed
strong empirical evidence that this short-term elasticity is close to zero. Take the
demand for automobile fuel, for instance. Goodwin et al.￿ s (2004) review of the
empirical literature ￿nds that 46 price elasticities of fuel consumption - calculated
by dynamic estimation methods using time-series data - range from ￿0:01 to ￿0:57,
with a mean of ￿0:25.16 These estimates are broadly in line with the ￿gures of other
reviews (for instance, OECD, 2006).
Moreover, recent studies ￿nd that the short-term price elasticity of fuel demand
has declined over time (Hughes et al., 2008, Small and Van Dender, 2007). Analysing
US data, Hughes et al. (2008) estimate that the short-term price elasticity of fuel de-
mand for the period 1975 to 1980 ranges from ￿0:32 to ￿0:34, whereas the elasticity
for the period from 2001 to 2006 ranges from ￿0:034 to ￿0:077.
In the long-term, demand is more elastic due to more fuel e¢ cient vehicles, as
captured in our model. In the studies reviewed by Goodwin et al. (2004), the
mean long-term elasticity is ￿0:64. Indeed, Austin and Dinan (2005) and Small and
15Technical details can be obtained upon request.
16The mean elasticity calculated by static estimation methods is ￿0:43 and thus also consistent
with our condition.
20Van Dender (2007) attribute about 50% and more of the long-term elasticity of fuel
demand to more fuel e¢ cient cars. These empirical studies support our focus on the
importance of energy e¢ ciency for energy conservation.
Establishing relationships between energy prices and the consumption intensity
of speci￿c household appliances, such as washing machines and TV sets, is certainly
a di¢ cult task. While there appears to be a lack of product-speci￿c studies, a
number of papers analyse the price elasticity of residential electricity in general.
Espey and Espey (2004) analyse 36 papers published between 1971 and 2000. In
their data-set, the short-term price elasticity of residential electricity ranges from
￿0:004 to ￿2:01, with a mean of ￿0:35 and a median of ￿0:28. While there is some
variation in the results, most studies ￿nd that residential electricity demand, like
fuel demand, is fairly price-inelastic (see also OECD, 2006/2008).
In a more recent study, Reiss and White (2005) stress the heterogeneity in house-
holds￿price elasticities. Analysing data from California, they estimate that the mean
short-term elasticity of residential electricity is ￿0:35. Even more interestingly, the
corresponding elasticity of households who have neither electric space heating nor
air-conditioning is very close to zero, with ￿0:08. That is, households who just use
energy for washing machines, refrigerators, television sets and the like practically ￿t
our description of households whose consumption intensity is fully price-inelastic.
Again, these ￿ndings suggest that our elasticity condition is in line with empirical
evidence.
There is evidence that environmental policy indeed causes changes in the design
of household appliances. Newell et al. (1999) ￿nd, for instance, that more than
half of the energy e¢ ciency gains of room air-conditioners and all of the energy e¢ -
ciency gains of water heaters are induced by changes in energy prices and e¢ ciency
standards.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse environmental policy in the case of vertically di⁄erenti-
ated markets and endogenous energy e¢ ciency levels. In particular, we explore how
distributional goals in addition to environmental goals a⁄ect the choice of environ-
mental policy instruments and the extent to which these instruments are applied.
Our paper shows that a minimum energy e¢ ciency standard is always part of the
optimal policy mix, regardless of the government￿ s distributional preferences. A
consumer-friendly government imposes a particularly strict standard and grants a
subsidy to ￿rms for investments in more energy e¢ cient products. In contrast, an
industry-friendly government introduces only a lax product standard and addition-
21ally levies a tax on energy.
We brie￿ y argue that our conclusions are robust against two important exten-
sions. The ￿rst extension considers energy costs in production while the second
allows for endogenous consumption intensities. In the latter case, our fundamental
market characteristics remain unchanged if the short-term energy demand remains
su¢ ciently price-inelastic. We provide some empirical evidence that our elasticity
condition is indeed reasonable.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (i) No ￿ boundary￿equilibrium: We start by excluding any price
competition equilibria with pi = 0. (Negative prices can obviously never emerge in
equilibrium.) Note ￿rst that the high quality ￿rm H can always set a positive price
and generate positive revenues, no matter what non-negative price ￿rm L chooses.
By contrast, the low quality ￿rm L is not able to charge a positive price and to
gain a positive market share if pH ￿ (1 + ￿)c(eH ￿ eL)z =: pH holds, which follows
directly from (2). For pL ￿ 0, however, @￿H=@pHjpH=pH ￿ 1 ￿ zF 0(z) > 0 results
(see, particularly, property (iii) of the distribution function). Thus, pH ￿ pH cannot
be an equilibrium. If an equilibrium exists, then pH > pH holds, implying that
pL > 0 (since, for pH > pH, there always exists a positive pL < pH that generates
positive revenues and thus dominates pL = 0; see, again, (2)). This equilibrium is
then described by (2) and (4).
Existence of unique ￿ interior￿equilibrium: If condition (5), which follows from
(2) and (4), de￿nes a unique threshold e z 2 (z;z), and thus unique prices pH and pL
(see, again, (4)), then there exists a unique equilibrium. We, therefore, show that a
unique threshold e z 2 (z;z) exists. We ￿rst di⁄erentiate [1 ￿ 2F(z)]=F 0(z) =: ￿(z)
with respect to z, implying that
@￿(z)
@z






results for F(z) 2 [0;0:5] , z 2 [z;zcrit], where zcrit is de￿ned as zcrit : F(zcrit) =
0:5. Moreover, inequality F 00(z) > ￿2
[F0(z)]
2
1￿F(z) holds under property (iv) of the distri-






1￿2F(z) results for z 2 [z;zcrit]. Thus, the
term ￿(z) continuously decreases with z in the interval [z;zcrit]. Additionally,
￿(z) = 1=F 0(z) > z (which follows from property (iii) of the distribution func-
tion), ￿(zcrit) = 0, and, for z 2 (zcrit;z], ￿(z) < 0 hold. Also, in the interval [z;z],
the term z is obviously positive and continuously increasing from z to z. Given all
these values and the fact that ￿(z) is strictly decreasing, and z is strictly increasing,
22with z, the intermediate value theorem implies that the equilibrium threshold e z is
uniquely determined by e z ￿ ￿(e z) = 0 or condition (5), with e z 2 [z;zcrit]. Moreover,
e z 2 [z;zcrit] implies that F(z) < 0:5. Thus pH > pL follows from (4)).
(ii) The equilibrium threshold e z only depends on the properties of the distrib-
ution function, as (5) directly shows, and is thus independent of tax ￿ and energy
e⁄ectiveness levels eH and eL; and so is then yH = 1 ￿ F (e z) and yL = F (e z).
(iii) Since e z is independent of ￿, eH, and eL, simple di⁄erentiation of (4) yields
@pH
@eH = (1 + ￿)c
[1￿F(e z)]
F0(e z) > 0,
@pH
@eL = ￿(1 + ￿)c
[1￿F(e z)]
F0(e z) < 0,
@pL





@eL = ￿(1 + ￿)c
F(e z)
F0(e z) < 0,
@pH
@￿ = c(eH ￿ eL)
[1￿F(e z)]





F0(e z) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 (i) To avoid misunderstandings, let us relabel the two ￿rms
as ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2. Inserting equilibrium values (4) and (5) into (3) yields ￿rm 1￿ s
piecewise de￿ned pro￿t function
￿1 (e1;e2) =
(
(1 + ￿)c(e2 ￿ e1)
[F(e z)]2
F0(e z) ￿ (1 ￿ s)a(e1) for e1 < e2
(1 + ￿)c(e1 ￿ e2)
[1￿F(e z)]2
F0(e z) ￿ (1 ￿ s)a(e1) for e1 ￿ e2
. (22)
For all e2, ￿rm 1￿ s pro￿t function (22) is continuous in e1, with local maxima at
e1 = emin and e1 = eH (where eH is de￿ned by (8)), as implied by (6) and (7).17
Comparing the two maxima yields ￿rm 1￿ s piecewise de￿ned reaction function
e1 =
(
eH for e2 < e e
emin for e2 ￿ e e
, (23)
where e e is de￿ned by e e : ￿1 (eH;e e) = ￿1 (emin;e e), with e e 2 (emin;eH). Note that
both eH and emin are independent of e2, as (6) and (7) show. Then the prop-
erty e e 2 (emin;eH) follows from the inequalities ￿1 (eH;emin) > ￿1 (emin;emin) and
￿1 (eH;e2 ￿ eH) < ￿1 (emin;e2 ￿ eH) (which in turn follows from (6) and (7)) and
the derivatives @￿1 (eH;e2)=@e2 < 0 for e2 2 [emin;eH]and @￿1 (emin;e2)=@e2 > 0.
Analogously, we derive ￿rm 2￿ s piecewise de￿ned reaction curve - just substitute
index 1 for 2 and vice versa. Therefore, only two equilibria are possible: Either ￿rm
1 chooses eH and ￿rm 2 chooses emin or vice versa.18
(ii) Using
@￿H















17One of the two local maxima disappears if e2 = emin or e2 ￿ eH.
18These equilibria additionally require that emin ￿ elim is su¢ ciently small, so that both ￿rms
can set su¢ ciently high prices and realise non-negative pro￿ts. Otherwise, one ￿rm would prefer
to exit the market.
23Obviously,
deH
demin = 0 results.
(iii) Equation (9) directly implies
deL





Proofs of the Proposition 1 (i) Consider two equivalent tax-subsidy bundles
(￿1;s1) and (￿2;s2), i.e. (12) holds. Since threshold e z is independent of tax ￿
and subsidy s (see lemma 1, part (ii)), and since eH (￿1;s1) = eH (￿2;s2) holds,
aH (￿1;s1) = aH (￿2;s2) and, for given emin (and thus eL and aL), E (￿1;s1;emin) =
E (￿2;s2;emin) result (see (8), (9), and (10)). Thus the traditional welfare component
x￿cE￿D(E)￿aH￿aL =: ￿ is equal for the two policy bundles (￿1;s1) and (￿2;s2)
and for given emin, i.e. ￿(￿1;s1;emin) = ￿(￿2;s2;emin). Then W (￿1;s1;emin)j￿=1 =
￿(￿1;s1;emin) = ￿(￿2;s2;emin) = W (￿2;s2;emin)j￿=1, as argued in part (i) of the
proposition.
(ii) and (iii) Welfare comparison: Consider again two equivalent tax-subsidy
bundles (￿1;s1) and (￿2;s2). Then
W (￿1;s1;emin) R W (￿2;s2;emin) (25)
, (￿ ￿ 1)[￿H (￿1;s1;emin) + ￿L (￿1;s1;emin)]
R (￿ ￿ 1)[￿H (￿2;s2;emin) + ￿L (￿2;s2;emin)] (26)
, (￿ ￿ 1)
"
(1 + ￿1)c(eH ￿ eL)
(1 ￿ F)
2 + F 2
F 0 ￿ (1 ￿ s1)aH ￿ (1 ￿ s1)aL
#
R (￿ ￿ 1)
"
(1 + ￿2)c(eH ￿ eL)
(1 ￿ F)
2 + F 2
F 0 ￿ (1 ￿ s2)aH ￿ (1 ￿ s2)aL
#
(27)






2 + F 2
F 0 ￿ aH ￿ aL
#






2 + F 2
F 0 ￿ aH ￿ aL
#
(28)






2 + F 2
F 0 ￿ aH ￿ aL
#
R 0 (29)
where, for given emin (and thus eL and aL), inequality (26) follows from the relation
￿(￿1;s1;emin) = ￿(￿2;s2;emin); inequalities (27) and (28) follow from (3), (4) and
(5); inequality (29) follows from eH (￿1;s1) = eH (￿2;s2), aH (￿1;s1) = aH (￿2;s2)
and the equivalence condition (12). (Here, we wrote, for short, F and F 0 instead of
F (e z) and F 0 (e z).)
24As discussed above, we focus on policies that allow both ￿rms to realise non-
negative pro￿ts, i.e. ￿H + ￿L ￿ 0 (and thus to stay in the market). Then the term
in the square bracket of inequality (29) is positive.
Consumer-friendly government: Consider a consumer-friendly government, i.e.
￿ < 1. In this case, inequality (29) implies that W (0;s1;emin) > W (￿2;s2;emin) ,
s1 ￿ s2 > 0. Indeed, for ￿1 = 0, equivalence condition (12) leads to s1 ￿ s2 =
￿2
1+￿2 (1 ￿ s2) > 0 for all s2 2 [0;1). This proves part (ii) of proposition 1.
Industry-friendly government: Next, consider an industry-friendly government,
i.e. ￿ > 1. In this case, inequality (29) directly implies that W (￿1;0;emin) >
W (￿2;s2;emin) , s1 ￿s2 < 0. Indeed, since s1 = 0 and s2 6= s1 (otherwise, the two
bundles (￿1;0) and (￿2;s2) were identical), s2 > 0 and ￿1 > ￿2 hold (otherwise, the
two bundles (￿1;0) and (￿2;s2) were not equivalent), and thus s1 ￿ s2 = ￿s2 < 0
results. This proves W (￿1;0;emin) > W (￿2;s2;emin), as stated in part (iii) of
proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2 For ￿ = 1, the ￿rst order conditions dW
d￿ = 0 , dW
ds = 0
and dW


















L (see (13), (14),
and (15)). Inserting (8) and (9) into these terms yields the optimal policy mix (16)
and (17). Obviously, one of the two ￿rst order conditions dW
d￿ = 0 and dW
ds = 0
is redundant, and the solution contains a variety of equivalent tax-subsidy bundles
that imply that the induced e¢ ciency level eH ful￿ls these ￿rst order conditions.
(Cf. proposition 1, part (i), and equivalence condition (12).)





























































































Proof of Proposition 3 (i) Proposition 1, part (ii), implies that any tax-subsidy
bundle (￿2;s2) with ￿2 > 0 cannot be optimal, as a consumer-friendly govern-
ment prefers the equivalent tax-subsidy bundle (0;s1); that is, W (0;s1;emin) >
W (￿2;s2;emin). Thus, the optimal policy mix is described by the ￿rst order condi-
tions dW=ds = 0 and dW=demin = 0 (see (14) and (15)).19
19The second order conditions are ful￿lled for ￿ = 1, as argued above (see proof of proposition
2). Using continuity arguments, we can show that the second order conditions are also ful￿lled for
￿ su¢ ciently close to one.


































aL > 0, and d2W








< 0. These inequalities,
together with d2W
de2
min < 0 (see footnote 17 on second order conditions), imply that
ds￿￿=d￿ > 0, as stated in part (i) of proposition 3.



















dsdemin < 0 for ￿ < 1, d2W
dsd￿ > 0, and d2W
demin d￿ < 0 (see above), together
with d2W
ds2 < 0 (see, again, footnote 17 on second order conditions), imply that
de￿￿
min=d￿ < 0, as stated in part (i) of proposition 3.
(ii) Recall that any welfare-maximising tax-subsidy bundle (￿￿;s￿) can be re-
placed by an equivalent bundle (0;s￿
1) that also maximises welfare W for ￿ = 1
(see propositions 1 and 2). In addition, ds=d￿ is a continuous function of ￿ be-
cause, as can be shown, all terms of this derivative are continuous in ￿ (continu-
ity theorem). The optimal subsidy s￿￿ is thus a continuous function of ￿, with
ds￿￿=d￿ > 0 (see above) and lim￿!1 s￿￿ = s￿
1. Consequently, s￿￿j￿<1 < s￿
1 holds.
Then, eH (0;s￿￿) < eH (0;s￿
1) = eH (￿￿;s￿), where the inequality sign follows from
deH=ds > 0 and the equals sign from de￿nition 1.
Similarly, demin=d￿ is a continuous function of ￿, since all terms of this derivative
are continuous in ￿. The optimal standard e￿￿
min is thus a continuous function of ￿,
with de￿￿






Proof of Proposition 4 (i) The proof of proposition 4 follows along the lines of
the proof of proposition 3. Proposition 1, part (ii), implies that any tax-subsidy
bundle (￿2;s2) with s2 > 0 cannot be optimal, since an industry-friendly gov-
ernment prefers the equivalent tax-subsidy bundle (￿1;0), i.e. W (￿1;0;emin) >
W (￿2;s2;emin). Thus, the optimal policy mix is described by the ￿rst-order condi-
tions dW=d￿ = 0 and dW=demin = 0 (see (13) and (15)).20


















20Again, it can be shown that the second order conditions are ful￿lled for ￿ su¢ ciently close to
one. Cf. proof of proposition 3.
26where d2W
d￿demin = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)c
[1￿F(e z)]2+[F(e z)]2



















> 0, and d2W
demin d￿ < 0 (see proof of
proposition 3, part (i)). These inequalities, together with d2W
de2
min < 0 (see footnote
18 on second order conditions), imply that d￿￿￿￿=d￿ > 0, as stated in part (i) of
proposition 4.



















d￿demin < 0 for ￿ > 1, d2W
d￿d￿ > 0, and d2W
demin d￿ < 0 (see above), together
with d2W
d￿2 < 0 (see, again, footnote 18 on second order conditions), imply that
de￿￿￿
min=d￿ < 0, as stated in part (i) of proposition 4.
(ii) Any welfare-maximising tax-subsidy bundle (￿￿;s￿) can be replaced by an
equivalent bundle (￿￿
1;0) that also maximises welfare W for ￿ = 1 (see propositions 1
and 2). Also, d￿=d￿ is a continuous function of ￿ because, as can be shown, all terms
of this derivative are continuous in ￿. The optimal tax ￿￿￿￿ is thus a continuous
function of ￿, with d￿￿￿￿=d￿ > 0 and lim￿!1 ￿￿￿￿ = ￿￿
1. Consequently, ￿￿￿￿j￿>1 > ￿￿
1
holds. Then, eH (￿￿￿￿;0) > eH (￿￿
1;0) = eH (￿￿;s￿), where the inequality sign follows
from deH=d￿ > 0 and the equals sign from de￿nition 1.
Similarly, demin=d￿ is a continuous function of ￿. The optimal standard e￿￿￿
min
is thus a continuous function of ￿, with de￿￿￿
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